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Abstract
What would happen if firms could collusively choose cost of transport (inconve-
nience) in Hotelling’s spatial model? This paper endogenises inconvenience in a three
stage game, where firms choose locations, the inconvenience, and finally compete in
price, on the assumption of a common reservation price. The equilibrium of the game
reveals a novel mechanism which induces firms to differentiate their products in moder-
ation by locating halfway to the center and choosing inconvenience such that the market
remains covered in equilibrium. Furthermore, using Launhardt’s model with differential
freight rate, it is shown that the collusive inconvenience is a Nash equilibrium.
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1 Introduction
This paper investigates the implications of the following famous quote:
‘These particular merchants would do well, instead of organizing improvement
clubs and booster associations to better the roads, to make transportation as
difficult as possible.1’ [p. 50 Hotelling (1929)]
Whilst being a very old insight (see e.g. Cantillon (1755)2 few attempts have been made
to endogenise the inconvenience parameter in spatial models of product differentiation.3
Given that inconvenience can be influenced when the parameter represents for example
cost of customising the good, or the probability of a having to return a faulty item, the
question remains, what if firms were to follow Hotelling’s advice? How difficult should the
merchants collectively make transportation? Furthermore, will it influence their choice of
locations, and thereby possibly resolve the existence problem? Finally, how stable is the
collusive inconvenience?
I answer these questions in a three stage version of Hotelling’s linear cost of transport
model with the addition of a common reservation price. In the first period the firms indepen-
dently choose locations which are fixed forever, they then jointly choose the inconvenience
parameter4, and finally compete in price. To avoid singularity problems associated with
the uniform distribution I solve the model for a class of distribution functions which in the
1This is a property of both linear and quadratic cost of transport as was formally derived in d’Aspremont,
Gabszewicz and Thisse [1979].
2Cantillon is the oldest reference I found describing the mechanism with a tailor pushing up prices ’till
the Villagers find it to their advantage to have their cloaths made in another Village, Town or City losing
the time spent going and returning’ [p.21].’ See He´bert (1981).
3The only examples are models of differential freight rate based on Launhardt’s (1885) and Cheysson
(1887) shipping models. See Dos Santos Ferreira (1998).
4This might involve lobbying for less money being spent on public transport, or in the case of customizing
the good, a technology for customising the good in a research joint venture.
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limit are the uniform. I find that the firms will locate halfway to the center, and choose
the inconvenience such that the market remains covered in equilibrium. Furthermore, using
Launhardt’s (1885) model with differential freight rate I show that the collusive inconve-
nience is a unique non-cooperative Nash equilibrium in pure strategies for the equilibrium
locations.
The collusive choice of inconvenience, in a setting where firms compete in price, is an
important topic since it analyses the effects of collusive behaviour in markets where ac-
tive anti-trust prevents firms from colluding in price. Instead firms will choose product
characteristics in such a way that they can credibly commit to not being too aggressive in
their pricing strategies. This is done by locating halfway to the center which minimises the
distance that marginal customers have to travel and therefore allows the firms to maximise
the inconvenience, and thus prices, subject to keeping the market covered. It should be
noted that since these locations are determined by the marginal rather than the average
distance to travel they only coincide with the socially efficient ones for a uniform distribu-
tion of consumers.5 The benefits are due to higher inconvenience being both a strategic
commitment to a firm itself to be less aggressive, as well as inducing its competitor to be
less aggressive.6 Furthermore, since these strategic benefits require that the firms are in-
deed competing for the customers, there is no incentive to make inconvenience so high that
the firms become local monopolists. The key assumption behind the principle of moderate
differentiation is thus the combination of elastic demand, endogenous inconvenience, and
endogenous locations. Other contributions in the field have identified existence problems
and solutions at the extremes when they exist, i.e. minimum or maximum differentiation,
in scenarios where at least one of these assumptions do not apply.
5This should be contrasted with Lederer and Hurter (1986) who have a model of spatial price discrimina-
tion where the incentive to choose efficient locations comes from minimising the average cost of travelling.
6Which can be seen in the analysis of differential inconvenience.
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The existence problem has been neatly dealt with by amongst others Dasgupta and
Maskin (1986), Caplin and Nalebuff (1991), Graitson (1982), and Shaked (1975, 1982),
with the general conclusion that there indeed exists no pure strategy equilibrium, but that a
mixed strategy equilibrium can be derived. The classic example of maximum differentiation
is due to D’Aspremont, Gabszewicz, and Thisse (1979) who showed that the existence
problem in Hotelling’s model would be resolved by assuming quadratic cost of transport
and result in firms locating at the end points.7It is, however, interesting to note that the
principle of moderate differentiation would apply to the quadratic case as well.8 Hotelling
(1929) constructed his model to explain the phenomenon of excessive sameness. Examples
of contributions confirming his intuition in different settings include Eaton and Lipsey
(1979) (for several firms), de Palma et al. (1985) (in probabilistic logit model), Stahl (1982)
(with consumer search), Friedman and Thisse (1993) (with semi-collusion) and Aguirre and
Espinoza (2003) (with endogenous point of delivery), Christou and Vettas (2004) (with
quality uncertainty). Gal-Or (1982) has an interesting interpretation of the model as a
model of sales. Another classic contribution is Rotschild (1979) who considered sequential
entry and existence problems.
An example of endogenous freight rate appears in Dos Santos Ferreira and Thisse (1996)
who find that firms that are located at the end points will choose the maximum freight
rate, in Launhardt’s (1885) shipping model on the assumption of two fixed locations and
an upper limit to the freight rate. The implication of these assumptions is that there is no
link between location and the maximum freight rate that can be charged and therefore no
incentive to differentiate in moderation.
Lerner and Singer (1937) in their reply to Hotelling’s contribution identified the problem
of assuming inelastic demand and suggested that consumers would have a finite reservation
7Another example of excessive differentiation can be found in Devetoglou (1965), who considered the case
of two dimensions.
8See the discussion.
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price. Since they assumed inconvenience to be exogenously given they and more recent
contributions by Economides (1984,1986), Hinloopen and van Marrewijk (1999) and Hin-
loopen (2002), have derived existence in settings where the market may be uncovered. Once
inconvenience is endogenised those outcomes can be ruled out since in equilibrium the firms
will choose to keep the market covered as is shown in this paper.
Outline of the paper. Section 2 presents the model and derives price equilibria for various
combinations of locations and inconvenience. Section 3 derives collusive inconvenience and
shows that it is a unique Nash equilibrium for the equilibrium locations. Section 4 finally
solves for the location, and shows that there exists an equilibrium for the three stage game
characterised by the principle of moderate differentiation. The paper concludes with a
discussion of model assumptions and the interpretation of the results. More extensive
proofs can be found in the appendix.
2 The Model
Let the length of the market be 1, a and b be the distance from the end points of firm A
and B respectively, and r = (1−a−b) the distance between the firms. Let pa and pb denote
the prices charged by firm A and B respectively. The production technology of the firms is
constant returns to scale with a marginal cost c ≥ 0.
Consumers are distributed on x ∈ [0, 1] according to the distribution function
F (x) =

x
1− h(1− 2z)
2z
if x ∈ [0, z)
1− h(1− 2x)
2
if x ∈ [z, 1− z]
1− (1− x)1− h(1− 2z)
2z
if x ∈ (1− z, 1]
(1)
with density
f(x) =

1− h(1− 2z)
2z
if x ∈ [0, z)
h if x ∈ [z, 1− z]
1− h(1− 2z)
2z
if x ∈ (1− z, 1],
(2)
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where h > 0 and z ∈ (h−12h , 12). This is a symmetric distribution which becomes the uniform
distribution for h = 1. For h > 1, it has two flat tails in the regions x < z and x > 1−z with
less density than the flat middle section. This function enables me to study the system for
distributions epsilon close to the uniform distribution thereby avoiding singularity problems
associated with the uniform distribution in deriving the equilibrium of the game.9
The consumers have a common reservation price V for a perfect match. For a less than
perfect match there is a cost t per unit of distance the consumer has to travel. A consumer
with location x ∈ [0, 1] buys one unit from firm A if the participation constraint (PC)
V − t | x− a | −pa ≥ 0, (3)
and the incentive compatibility constraint (IC)
V − t | x− a | −pa ≥ V − t | 1− b− x | −pb, (4)
are both satisfied. From (IC) follows that a consumer with location
x˜ =
pb − pa + t(1 + a− b)
2t
, (5)
will be indifferent between the two firms.
The effect of the participation constraints is that the demand will be discontinuous in
price. If the price is low, the market will be covered and the demand will be determined
by the location of the indifferent consumer. As the price gets higher, the participation
constraint will either bind in the hinterland, if the hinterland is closer than the location of
the indifferent consumer, or for the indifferent consumer. In the latter case the firm becomes
a local monopoly. For even higher prices the constraint will be binding in both hinterland
and for the indifferent consumer, making the firm a local monopoly with elastic demand in
both directions. Hence, there are three conditions which in different combinations determine
9This distribution can be seen as a stylized city versus country side version, where z is the location of
the boundary between the city and the countryside where the population density suddenly drops.
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where the demand curve kinks.10
First, the participation constraint of the indifferent consumer which is binding if V −
t(x˜− a)− pa ≤ 0. Substitution of x˜ gives,
tr ≥ 2V − pa − pb. (6)
If this constraint is binding there will be a marginal consumer
xm =
V + ta− pa
t
< x˜. (7)
Second, the participation constraint in the hinterland which is binding if V −ta−pa ≤ 0,
i.e. if it is too costly to travel due to distance a and/or cost per unit of distance t,
ta ≥ V − pa. (8)
If it is binding there will be a marginal consumer
xh =
ta− V + pa
t
> 0. (9)
Third, the condition that determine which constraint will be binding first when the firm
increases its price. Firm A is located closer to the hinterland than the indifferent consumer
if x˜− a > a. Substituting for x˜ and simplifying gives
t(1− 3a− b) > pa − pb. (10)
Hence, at equal prices, the constraint will bind for the indifferent consumer before it binds
in the hinterland if 1 > 3a+ b.
The demand to firm A can thus be summarised as follows
da =

F (x˜) if no participation constraint is binding;
F (x˜)− F (xh) if (8) holds and (10) does not;
F (xm) if (6) and (10) hold;
F (xm)− F (xh) if (6) and (8) hold.
(11)
10Note that symmetry implies that it is sufficient to give a complete characterisation of the problem for
firm A.
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The timing of the game is as follows. In the first period the firms independently choose
their respective locations which are fixed forever. In the second period their choice of
locations are revealed and the firms collusively decide on the technology for customising the
good, i.e. the inconvenience. In the third period the firms compete in price. This game is
solved using backward induction. Hence we start in the final period by characterising the
price equilibria.
In the final period each firm chooses price taking locations and inconvenience as given.
Hence, the objective of firm A is to choose price pa to maximise the profit pia = (pa − c)da.
The first order condition for an interior solution can be found by setting the first derivative
equal to zero. However, since the demand curve is kinked in several places, so will the first
derivative be,
∂pia
∂pa
=

F (x˜)− (pa − c)
2t
f(x˜) if no participation constraint is binding;
F (x˜)− F (xh)− (pa − c)
(
f(x˜)
2t
+
f(xh)
t
)
if (8) holds and (10) does not;
F (xm)− (pa − c)
t
f(xm) if (6) and (10) hold;
F (xm)− F (xh)− pa − c
t
[f(xm) + f(xh)] if (6) and (8) hold.
(12)
The same applies to firm B. Hence, the equilibrium when it exists will either occur at a
kink or be interior depending on parameter values.
Definition 1 Critical values on t for an interior solution are
tmax =
2h(V − c)
2 + hr
, (13)
tha =
3h(V − c)
3 + h(4a− b) , (14)
thb =
3h(V − c)
3 + h(4b− a) . (15)
These are derived from the binding participation constraints in equilibrium for the three
marginal consumers with locations {0, x˜, 1}.
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The existence of an interior solution furthermore depends on locations of the firms and
parameters of the distribution function.
Proposition 1 (Classical Hotelling) Let t ≤ min{tmax, tha, thb }, and a, b be such that
z <
1
2
+
a− b
6
(16)
and
min
{
2h− 1
2h
+
h
2
(
a− b
3
)2
− a+ 5b
3
,
2h− 1
2h
+
h
2
(
b− a
3
)2
− 5a+ b
3
}
≥ 0 (17)
then the interior solution is a price equilibrium with
pHa = c+ t
(
1
h
+
a− b
3
)
(18)
pHb = c+ t
(
1
h
+
b− a
3
)
(19)
and profit
piHa =
th
2
(
1
h
+
a− b
3
)2
(20)
piHb =
th
2
(
1
h
+
b− a
3
)2
(21)
Proof. in the appendix.
The main implication from h > 1 is that there will exist an equilibrium in price even
when firms are located closer than halfway to the center, i.e. a > 1/4. This can be illustrated
for the symmetric case, i.e. for a = b. The condition for under cut proof equilibrium (17)
then becomes
r >
1
2h
. (22)
Hence, the higher the relative proportion of consumers in the middle segment, the smaller
the distance between the firms r that is compatible with an equilibrium. This is because a
higher h means more elastic demand in the middle and thus lower equilibrium prices and
profits, which makes undercutting relatively less profitable since the firm has to undercut
by a fixed amount tr.
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Since the profit is increasing in t and a and b respectively firms have incentives to move
closer to the center and to increase inconvenience. However, if they do so, the classical case
will no longer prevail due to binding participation constraints. If t > tmax the firms become
local monopolists, whereas if t > min{tha, thb } at least one firm will be faced with elastic
hinterland. The monopoly outcome plays an important role in deriving the equilibrium of
the game, as well as showing that the collusive inconvenience also is a Nash equilibrium. It
has the following properties.
Proposition 2 (Monopoly) Let a, b ≤ 1/4 and t > tmax. The monopoly solution is a
corner solution with price and profit
pMa = V −
t
6
(3− b− 5a), (23)
piMa =
(
V − c− t
6
(3− b− 5a)
)(
3 + h(a− b)
6
)
. (24)
Proof: in the appendix.
The reason for this outcome is that a firm who is a monopoly would maximise profits by
serving more than half of the market. Hence, if the firms were to implement the monopoly
prices, they would be competing for the indifferent consumer and thus no longer be in a
monopoly position.
Corollary 1 (Covered market) A firm can not raise profits by becoming a local monop-
olist through increasing inconvenience.
When t > min{tha, thb }, the participation constraint in the hinterland under Hotelling
prices will be binding for at least one firm. This has the implication that unless t is very
high, at least one firm will choose a corner solution for the price. For example if one firm,
say firm A moves closer to the center when the two firms are located halfway, i.e when
a > b = 1/4, there exists an asymmetric equilibrium in the immediate neighbourhood of
tha, where firm A chooses a corner solution and B chooses an interior solution for their
respective prices. This equilibrium is characterised in the following proposition.
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Proposition 3 (Asymmetric Equilibrium) Let a > b be such that (8) is binding for
firm A but not for firm B and
h >
3
(b− a)2
[
−(3− 5a− b) +
√
(3− 5a− b)2 + (b− a)2
]
. (25)
Then there exists an equilibrium in the neighbourhood of tha with prices
pAa = V − ta (26)
pAb =
t[1 + h(b− 2a)] + h(V + c)
2h
(27)
and profits
piAa = (V − ta− c)
t[3 + h(2a− b)]− h(V − c)
4t
(28)
piAb =
(t(1 + h(b− 2a)) + h(V − c))2
8ht
, (29)
Proof. In the appendix.
Once B also faces a binding incentive constraint from the hinterland, due to either a
higher t, or being located at b > 1/4 there exists an equilibrium in which both firms choose
corner solutions with pa = V − ta and pb = V − tb, which results in profits
pia = (V − c− ta)1 + 2h(a− b)2 (30)
pib = (V − c− tb)1 + 2h(b− a)2 . (31)
Necessary conditions for such an equilibrium to exist is that h > 1 and t > (V−c)[1−2h(a−b)]2−a[3+2h(a−b)] .
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When the corner solution no longer applies, there exists an interior solution in price with
uncovered hinterland. There are two possibilities in this case. First the outcome where the
marginal consumer in the hinterland is in the tails, which results in prices and profits that
are definitely lower than for the Hotelling outcome.12 Second, the case where the marginal
11The first to guarantee existence for locations closer to the center, and the latter to make it unprofitable
to undercut the delivered price of the competitor to get the entire market demand.
12Complete derivations of this case are very lengthy and are available from the author upon request.
12
consumer is on the city boundary and the countryside does not get served. This case is only
potentially relevant when the tails of the distribution are very thin, whereas we are more
interested in distributions close to the uniform. It is therefore not included here.13
3 Optimal inconvenience
In the second period firms observe their respective locations prior to jointly selecting the
inconvenience that maximises their joint profits.
The joint profit will be maximised for a covered market even when firms are asymmet-
rically located as long as h belongs to a critical interval which is defined by,
h1 =
3
[
11a− 2b−√89a2 + 8ab− 16b2
]
2(8a2 − 13ab+ 5b2) (32)
h2 =
3
[
11a− 2b+√89a2 + 8ab− 16b2
]
2(8a2 − 13ab+ 5b2) . (33)
Hence,
Proposition 4 (Collusive inconvenience) The collusive inconvenience is given by
tC =

tmax if a, b ≤ 1/4 and h ≥ 1
tha if a > max{1/4, b} and h ∈ (h1, h2)
thb if b > max{1/4, a} and h ∈ (h1, h2).
(34)
Proof: in the appendix.
The intuition for this result is as follows. If firms are located relatively further away
from the center or exactly midway, joint profits can be increased by increasing t as long
as the indifferent consumer gets a non-negative surplus. Beyond that, the firms become
monopolists with a profit which is decreasing in t. Similarly for locations closer to the
center, profits can be raised through higher inconvenience up until one of the participation
constraints starts to bind from the hinterland.
13The conclusions in this case are straightforward. Derivations are available from the author upon request.
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Would either firm have an incentive to deviate from tC if they had the chance prior to
competing in price?
When firms can choose different technologies for customising the good the inconvenience
will be indexed ti, i = a, b. This implies that the participation constraint becomes V − ti |
x− a | −pi ≥ 0 for i = a, b, and similarly for the (IC) constraint. Solving for the indifferent
consumer gives
x˜(ta, tb) =
pb − pa + taa+ tb(1− b)
ta + tb
. (35)
For ta, tb and a, b in the neighbourhood of tC and a = b = 1/4 the demand to firm A is
F [x˜(ta, tb)]14. When there is an interior solution to the problem the firm thus maximises
max
pa
(pa − c) ta[1− h(1− 2a)] + tb[1 + h(1− 2b)] + 2h(pb − pa)2(ta + tb) . (36)
From first order conditions we can derive best response prices
pa =
ta[1− h(1− 2a)] + tb[1 + h(1− 2b)]
4h
+
pb + c
2
. (37)
Differential inconvenience allows us to decouple the strategic effects from inconvenience
on price. First, the effect on oneself which is decreasing in h and increasing in a. If
h(1 − 2a) < 1 this effect is positive, i.e. it induces a firm to be less aggressive in the
terminology of Fudenberg and Tirole (1984). The second effect is to induce the competitor
to be less aggressive, which is increasing in h and decreasing in b. Hence, when there is more
competition in the middle of the market, i.e. h > 1, the effect of increasing inconvenience
will have a weaker commitment effect on oneself, but a stronger effect on the competitor to
be less aggressive. There is also a general effect on price levels when the market gets more
competitive in the middle, which is to reduce those prices. The overall effect is negative
∂pa
∂h
= − ta + tb
2h2
. (38)
14In the neighbourhood of parameter values for which there is an interior solution in the Hotelling case,
there will also be an interior solution in the Launhardt case. See Dos Santos Ferreira and Thisse (1996)
for a complete characterisation of demand patterns including offering a much lower freight rate such that
customers in the competitors hinterland gets served.
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How negative is a function of the average inconvenience.
The equilibrium prices in the neighbourhood of tC can be derived from the intersection
of the best response functions.
pSa = c+
ta[3− h(1− 2a)] + tb[3 + h(1− 2b)]
6h
, (39)
pSb = c+
ta[3 + h(1− 2a)] + tb[3− h(1− 2b)]
6h
, (40)
which results in profits
piSa =
(ta[3− h(1− 2a)] + tb[3 + h(1− 2b)])2
36h(ta + tb)
, (41)
piSb =
(ta[3 + h(1− 2a)] + tb[3− h(1− 2b)])2
36h(ta + tb)
. (42)
Note that piSi = pi
H
i for ta = tb. These profits can therefore be used to prove that the
collusive inconvenience is indeed a Nash equilibrium.
Proposition 5 (Strategic Inconvenience) Let h ∈ [1, 3). The cooperative inconve-
nience tC is the unique Nash equilibrium of the sub-game where two firms with locations
a = b = 1/4 independently choose their own inconvenience ta, tb prior to competing in price.
Proof. Symmetry implies that it is sufficient to show for one firm that there does not exist
a profitable deviation. This is true if the profit is increasing in ta for ta < tC and decreasing
for ta > tC . Taking the first derivative of the profit function with respect to ta gives
∂pia
∂ta
=
(ta[3− h(1− 2a)] + tb[3 + h(1− 2b)])
36h(ta + tb)2
(ta[3− h(1− 2a)] + tb[3− h(3− 4a− 2b)])
which is positive for the equilibrium locations a = b = 1/4 and ta = tb if h < 3.
For ta > tC , Proposition 2 applies, since for a monopoly it makes no difference whether
t is the same or different. Hence the profit is decreasing in ta.
The equilibrium is unique since at a = b = 1/4, ta, tb is the unique solution to a system
of two linear equations: V − taa− pSa = 0 and V − tbb− pSb = 0, which are the participation
constraints of the consumers with locations 0 and 1. Q.E.D.
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For other locations the Nash equilibrium may no longer be unique. For example if firms
are located at a, b < 1/4, all combinations of ta, tb such that the participation constraint of
the indifferent consumer is exactly binding will be a Nash equilibrium.
Finally, how will firms strategically position themselves if they know they are going to
choose inconvenience collusively, and that there will be no incentive to deviate once it has
been implemented prior to competing in price. This is the topic of the next section.
4 Location and the degree of differentiation
In the first period the firms independently choose locations which are fixed forever. Before
presenting the equilibrium of the three stage game, two useful benchmarks for the locations
and the degree of differentiation will be derived.
Lemma 1 The degree of differentiation, subject to the market being covered, i.e. tCr is
maximised for r = 1.
Proof. The degree of differentiation is
tCr =

tmaxr if a, b ≤ 1/4
thar if a > max{1/4, b}
thb r if b > max{1/4, a}.
(43)
It is clear that a maximum cannot happen for thi , i = a, b, since the inconvenience and the
distance are decreasing if firms move closer to the center. Whereas for locations such that
tmax applies, moving closer implies a smaller r but a higher tmax, hence there will be a
trade-off. To see this take the first derivative of
tmaxr =
2h(V − c)
2 + hr
r (44)
with respect to the distance between the firms r, which gives
∂tmaxr
∂r
=
2h(V − c)
2 + hr
− 2h(V − c)
(2 + hr)2
hr (45)
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=
4h(V − c)
(2 + hr)2
> 0. (46)
It is clear that the location effect dominates the inconvenience effect. Q.E.D.
Thus, even though the inconvenience will be lower when firms locate at the end points,
these are the locations which maximise the total degree of differentiation. Let us next
consider the locations that minimise the average time to travel in the market.
Lemma 2 The efficient locations are given by
ae =
2h− 1
4h
(47)
Proof. Due to symmetry it is sufficient to minimise the average distance to travel for
consumers with locations x ∈ [0, 12 ]. For a > z the average distance to travel is given by∫ z
0
(a− s)1− h(1− 2z)
2z
ds+
∫ a
z
(a− s)hds+
∫ 1
2
a
(s− a)hds =
(
a− z
2
)
1− 2h
2
+ a2h+
h
8
Minimising over a gives 1−2h2 + 2ha = 0. Q.E.D.
For a uniform distribution the efficient locations will be a = b = 1/4. However, for h > 1
a location slightly closer to the center will be optimal.
Having derived these two benchmarks for the locations and the degree of differentiation,
it is time turn to the first period choices in the three stage game.
What location maximises the firm’s profit taking into account the effect it will have on
t and pa and pb in consecutive periods?
Proposition 6 (The Principle of Moderate Differentiation) Let 1 < h < min{2b , 2a}.
Firms locating at a∗ = b∗ = 1/4, choosing inconvenience t∗ = 4h(V−c)4+h , and prices p
∗
a = p
∗
b =
c + 4(V−c)4+h , with payoff pi
∗
a = pi
∗
b =
2(V−c)
4+h constitute a Nash equilibrium in a sequential
game where firms independently choose locations, collusively the inconvenience, and finally
compete price.
Proof: Symmetry implies that it is sufficient to check that a = 1/4 is indeed a Nash
equilibrium when b = 1/4.
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Firm A has no incentive to move closer if the first derivative with respect to a is positive
for a < a∗ and negative for a ≥ a∗. The first derivative has two effects
dpia
da
=
∂pia
∂a
+
∂pia
∂t
∂t
∂a
. (48)
In Proposition 1 it was shown that the profit function in the neighbourhood of a∗, b∗ will
be given by piHa if h > 1. Hence, whilst the functional form of the optimal inconvenience
will change at a∗, the profit function is unchanged in the neighbourhood of the equilibrium.
Substitution of tC gives
pi∗a =

h2(V − c)
2 + hr
(
1
h
+
a− b
3
)2
if a < a∗
3h2(V − c)
2(3 + h(4a− b))
(
1
h
+
a− b
3
)2
if a ≥ a∗
(49)
Note that for a < a∗ both effects are positive
∂pi∗a
∂a
=
2(V − c)h2
3(2 + hr
[
1 +
a− b
3
]
+
(V − c)h3
(2 + hr)2
[
1 +
a− b
3
]2
(50)
whereas for a ≥ a∗ the second effect is negative and dominates,
∂pi∗a
∂a
= −(2− hb) 3h
2(V − c)
2[3 + h(4a− b)]
(
1
h
+
a− b
3
)
< 0, (51)
if h < 2/b. Symmetry implies that firm B has no incentive to move closer to the center for
h < 2/a.
The equilibrium inconvenience, prices and profits are derived by substituting for a =
b = 1/4 in tC , pHi , and pi
H
i , i = a, b. Q.E.D.
The equilibrium locations are independent of h. However, the inconvenience is increasing
in h whereas the profit is decreasing. When there is more agglomeration of taste in the
middle, competition for customers will be more fierce, to which the firms respond by making
cost of customising higher to relax competition, rather than moving further afield. However,
the negative effect on profit from more elastic demand will still dominate the positive effect
from higher inconvenience. This provides an interesting prediction from the model.
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Corollary 2 There is a negative correlation between degree of differentiation and prof-
itability.
Hence, markets with a greater concentration of taste will have more differentiated products,
and lower profits. Furthermore the firms will choose locations that are further apart than
the efficient ones the higher is h, ae > a∗ but never so much that they maximise the degree
of differentiation.
5 Discussion
The contribution of this paper is threefold. First, it has shown that collusive choice of
inconvenience can resolve the existence problem in the Hotelling linear city model. Second, it
has shown that the collusive inconvenience is a Nash equilibrium. Third, it has revealed that
firms will not change the location of the standard variety when there is more concentration
of consumers in the middle relative to the tails of the taste distribution. The locations
will therefore be too far apart relative to social optimum. Instead the firms will respond
by increasing the cost of customising the good, thereby increasing the degree of product
differentiation in markets with a higher concentration of taste in the middle.
These results were derived under a specific set of assumptions, which I will discuss.
The uniform distribution is often used in models of spatial differentiation due to its sim-
plicity. However, in the Hotelling model it does give rise to singularity problems such as the
derivative of the profit function not being defined at the equilibrium point. The class of dis-
tribution functions I have introduced in this paper are in the limit the uniform distribution,
and therefore allow me to show that I can avoid the singularity problems using a distribu-
tion function epsilon close the uniform. These distributions also have attractive economic
features since the flat tails and higher flat middle section make them a cubist15 version
of an S-shaped distribution function, capturing the essence without potential problems of
15It looks like the way Picasso would have painted the Gaussian distribution.
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non-linearity. They can therefore be used for the purpose of comparative statics, which I
have done in this paper to see how the degree of differentiation is affected by changes in the
distribution of taste. The interpretation of this distribution as representing the differences
in population density between the city and the countryside might also be of use in other
applications.
There are three assumptions relating to inconvenience, the linearity, the collusive choice
and the zero cost, which are worth commenting on. The linearity assumption is the case
where there will be existence problems when inconvenience is not endogenous. However,
the principle of moderate differentiation is not specific to linear inconvenience. Preliminary
calculations of the quadratic case reveals that the principle of moderate differentiation
would apply. Though in that case, because of a binding participation constraint from the
indifferent consumer, rather than the consumer in the hinterland, which prevents firms from
wishing to move too far out.
Collusive inconvenience has several advantages. It is a benchmark for the highest profit
obtainable. It captures both the Hotelling and the Launhardt models, since it is shown
to be a Nash equilibrium. Furthermore it captures what firms who are inclined to collude
would do when they are prevented from colluding in price by active anti-trust. It also
overcomes the problem of equilibrium selection when there exists several Nash equilibria
in inconvenience, which happens for some locations. However, as was shown in this paper,
at the equilibrium of the three stage game, the collusive inconvenience is not only a Nash
equilibrium, it is also unique. Hence, it is stable and does not require repeated interaction
to be implemented. This could be contrasted with semi-collusion derived in Friedman and
Thisse (1993) who consider collusion in price which is supported by a trigger strategy, and
non-cooperative choice of locations.
The analysis in this paper was made under the simplifying assumption that there is no
cost of neither location nor inconvenience, thereby entirely focussing on the strategic role
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of product characteristics. If the analysis were to be extended to include costs, additional
trade-offs would enter the picture. For example if locations are more expensive at the center,
the existence problem could be resolved by simply adding a differential cost of location. In
the case of inconvenience, a cost saving associated with higher inconvenience, would give
the firms an additional incentive to increase inconvenience. However, unless the marginal
cost saving would be higher than the marginal reduction in price which happens in the
monopoly regime, the firms would still not have incentives to become local monopolists,
and hence we would still get the result that inconvenience is chosen as high as it can be to
allow the firms to strategically benefit from it when competing in price.
Inconvenience has deliberately been chosen in favour of the more commonly used term
cost of transport, as a generic term in instances where it can be chosen by the firms either
collusively by choice or force of circumstance, or independently, rather than being exogenous
to the model. When inconvenience, does represent the inconvenience associated with the
service, it is a variable that could be chosen independently by the firms, however, there may
be an implicit agreement in for example banking to collude on the level of inconvenience in
opening bank accounts et cetera. And as have been shown in this paper, there would be no
incentives to deviate from such collusion. Hence, no trigger strategy would be needed to
support such an equilibrium. If, on the other hand, inconvenience represents a cost which
can only be indirectly influenced by the firms through collective action, such as lobbying
for just the right amount being spent on roads and public transport, it can only be chosen
collusively. In the interpretation that it represents the cost of customising the good, the
model indicates that the incentives to develop technology for customising goods in a research
joint venture might be biased and lead to a more costly technology the more concentrated
the taste is in the market. Whereas the firms would have incentives to develop a cheap
technology for customising the goods when the distribution of taste is dispersed with very
little concentration in the middle.
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An alternative approach to endogenising inconvenience would be to have a monopoly
supplier of transport who sets the freight rate. This would result in solving a three player
game. Spulber (1981) looked at this problem in the case of a monopoly supplier of a good
and a monopoly supplier of transport. What happens in the duopoly case is left for future
research.
A Proofs
Proofs of Propositions 1,2 3 and 4 follow.
Proof of Proposition 1. The Hotelling outcome requires that the market is covered in equilib-
rium, hence the participation constraint cannot be binding for either of the marginal consumers.
Substitution of pHa and p
H
b in the participation constraints of the consumers with locations 0, x˜ and
1 respectively gives
V − ta− c− t
(
1
h
+
a− b
3
)
≥ 0, (52)
V − t(1
2
+
a− b
6
− a)− c− t
(
1
h
+
a− b
3
)
≥ 0, (53)
V − tb− c− t
(
1
h
− a− b
3
)
≥ 0. (54)
Solving for t gives tha , tmax and thb respectively.
First order conditions when the market is covered will be given by
t[1− h(b− a)] + hpb
2t
− 2pa − c
2t
h = 0, (55)
t[1 + h(b− a)] + hpa
2t
− 2pb − c
2t
h = 0, (56)
for z < x˜. Note that pHa , pHb solves this system of equations, hence x˜
H(pHa , pHb ) =
1
2 +
a−b
6 . Substi-
tution of equilibrium prices, pia = (pHa − c)F (x˜H) gives the profit function.
Finally we have to confirm that it does not pay for either of the firms to undercut the delivered
price of the competitor to get the entire market demand, i.e. firm A would not prefer to charge
pb − tr − ε and get the entire market to pHa . This requires that
c+ t
(
1
h
+
b− a
3
)
− t(1− a− b)− c < th
2
(
1
h
+
a− b
3
)2
. (57)
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Collecting terms and simplifying
a+ 5b
3
<
2h− 1
2h
+
h
2
(
a− b
3
)2
(58)
By symmetry one can infer that firm B similarly has no incentive to undercut if the left hand side
is 5a+b3 . Since the condition has to be satisfied for both firms, the most constraining of the two, sets
the requirement on a, and b. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2. An interior solution requires that the candidate monopoly price is at
least as high as the hypothetical Hotelling price would be, i.e. pM ≥ pHa . From the first derivative
of the profit function one can see that there are two potential candidate prices for interior solutions
depending on whether one or two participation constraints are binding.
The first order condition if only the constraint is binding from the center is
1− h
(
1− 2V + ta− pa
t
)
2
− pa − c
t
h = 0. (59)
Solving for the price gives
pM1a =
t(1− h(1− 2a)) + 2h(V + c)
4h
. (60)
For this to be higher than the Hotelling price the following must be true
V + c
2
+
t(1− h(1− 2a))
4h
≥ c+ t
(
1
h
+
a− b
3
)
(61)
which is equivalent to
t ≤ 6h(V − c)
9 + h(3− 2a− 4b) . (62)
However, we know that t > tmax for the monopoly case to apply. Hence,
2h(V − c)
2 + hr
< t ≤ 6h(V − c)
9 + h(3− 2a− 4b) . (63)
This is only possible if 3 ≤ h(b − a). For b ≤ a it is therefore impossible. For b > a, we can derive
the smallest h that may apply. Note that b < 13 and a ≥ 0 for the monopoly situation to arise.
Substitution of the boundaries of a and b gives h > 9. We can find the upperbound to h, by noticing
that the density for x < z has to be positive and that z < x˜ = 3+a−b6 =
4
9 . Substituting for z =
4
9
and noticing the density has to be positive gives
1− h(1− 24
9
) > 0, (64)
23
i.e. h < 9. Hence we arrive at two mutually exclusive conditions on h.
The other monopoly price is derived from the first order condition when the participation con-
straint is binding from both hinterland and the center. It is given by
1− h(1− 2xm)
2
− 1− h(1− 2z)
2z
xh − pa − c
t
(
h+
1− h(1− 2z)
2z
)
= 0 (65)
Simplifying
t
1− h(1− 4z)
[
(z − xh)(1− h) + 2hz(xm − xh)]− (pa − c) = 0 (66)
substitution of xm and xh and collecting terms gives
t(z − a)(1− h)
1− h(1− 4z) − 2pa + V + c = 0 (67)
Thus
pM2a =
V + c
2
+
t(z − a)(1− h)
2(1− h(1− 4z)) (68)
Note that pM2a < p
M1
a can be shown to be equivalent to (1− h(1− 2z))(1− h(1− 4a)) > 0, which is
satisfied since a < 1/4. Given that pM1a < p
H
a it thus follows that p
M2
a < p
H
a .
With a profit that is increasing over the entire range, the solution therefore occurs at the kink
where V − t(x˜− a)− pM = 0. Substitution of x˜ = 3+a−b6 and solving for pM gives the price. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3. The proof involves showing that these prices indeed satisfy first order
conditions for a maximum, and that it does not pay to undercut these prices for the relevant range
of parameter values.
When the constraint is binding in the hinterland firm A’s best response price to pb will occur at
a kink, pa = V − ta, if the first derivative of the profit function is increasing before and decreasing
after the kink,
∂pia
∂pa
=

1− h(1− 2x˜)
2
− pa − c
2t
h > 0 if pa < V − ta
(z−xh)(1−h)+2hz(x˜−xh)
2z − (pa − c)
(
1− h(1− 3z)
2zt
)
< 0 otherwise.
(69)
To derive the relevant pb one has to consider B’s best response to pa = V − ta which is
pHb (pa) =
t[1 + h(b− 2a)] + h(V + c)
2h
(70)
as long as the participation constraint is not binding in the hinterland, i.e.
V − tb− t[1 + h(b− 2a)] + h(V + c)
2h
≥ 0, (71)
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which holds if t ≤ h(V−c)1+h(3b−2a) . For an equilibrium to exist it is required that h(V−c)1+h(3b−2a) > tha , which
holds if a > b. Hence it is satisfied.
Substitution of pHb in (69) and simplifying shows that the first derivative is increasing before
pa = V − ta,
t(3 + h(4a− b))− 3h(V − c)
4t
> 0, (72)
i.e. if t > tha , and that it is decreasing after the kink
z(3− h(4a+ b))− 2a(1− h)
4z
− (V − c)(2− h(2− 7z))
4zt
< 0 (73)
i.e. if
t <
(V − c)(2− h(2− 7z))
z(3− h(4a+ b)) + 2a(h− 1) (74)
For an equilibrium to exist, this upperbound has to be higher than tha , thus
2(V − c)(2− h(2− 7z))
z(1 + h(8a− b))− 2a(h− 1) >
3h(V − c)
3 + h(4a− b) . (75)
rearranging and simplifying gives
3 > h(3− 7a+ b− 6z) + h2[a(7− 20z)− b(1− 2z)], (76)
which is satisfied. To see this consider z = 1/4, in which case the condition is satisfied for all h in
the relevant range h ∈ (1, 2).16
Firm A has no incentive to undercut B by charging pb − tr − ε and get the entire market if
t[1− h(2− 3b)] + h(V − c)
2h
≤ (V − ta− c) t[3 + h(2a− b)]− h(V − c)
4t
(77)
Substitution of tha gives
6 + h(3− 10b+ 4a) + h2(a− b)2 ≥ 0, (78)
which holds with strict inequality since all three terms are positive. Hence, there is no incentive for
A to undercut B in the neighbourhood of tha .
Similarly firm B has no incentive to undercut A by charging pa− tr−ε and get the entire market
if
[V − c− t(1− b)] ≤ (t(1 + h(b− 2a)) + h(V − c))
2
8ht
(79)
16h > 2 implies the tails have negative mass which is impossible.
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For tha this becomes
9 ≤ 6h(3− 5a− b) + h2(b− a)2. (80)
Calculating the positive root, this condition becomes
h >
3
(b− a)2
[
−(3− 5a− b) +
√
(3− 5a− b)2 + (b− a)2
]
. (81)
The more asymmetrically located the firms, the higher the density required in the middle for B
to abstain from undercutting. Note that in the immediate neighbourhood of a = b = 1/4, the
requirement is h > 1. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4. To prove this we need to show that the joint profit is increasing for
t ≤ tC , and that it is decreasing for t ≥ tC . Let Π = pia+pib. For t ≤ tC Hotelling prices apply with
the joint profit
ΠH(t) =
th
2
[(
l
h
+
a− b
3
)2
+
(
l
h
+
b− a
3
)2]
(82)
= th
[
1
h2
+
(a− b)2
9
]
(83)
This profit is clearly increasing in t.
For t > tC there are two cases depending on the locations of the firms.
When a, b ≤ 1/4, ΠH is maximised for tmax. For t > tmax the monopoly outcome applies. It
follows directly from Proposition 2 that the monopoly profit is decreasing in t.
Otherwise ΠH will be maximised for tha , for locations closer to the center that are compatible
with the condition for equilibrium existence as defined by (17).
In these instances the firms will either both choose a corner solution, in which case it follows
directly from (30) that the joint profit is decreasing in t, or if only one of them faces a binding
constraint from the hinterland the asymmetric case applies in the immediate neighbourhood of tha .
Let ΠA = piAa , piAb . Then we need to show that
∂ΠA
∂t < 0 at t
h
a , since we know that at tha ΠH = ΠA
by definition.
∂ΠA
∂t
= − t
2a(3 + h(2a− b))− h(V − c)2
4t2
+
t2(1 + h(b− 2a))2 − h2(V − c)2
8ht2
(84)
=
h2(V − c)2 − t2(10ha− 2hb− 1 + h2(2ab− b2))
8ht2
, (85)
evaluated at tha gives
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∂ΠA
∂t
=
9− 3h(11a− 2b) + h2(8a2 − 13ab+ 5b2)
36h
(86)
this derivative is negative if h ∈ (h1, h2), which are the roots of the numerator
h1 =
3
[
11a− 2b−√89a2 + 8ab− 16b2]
2(8a2 − 13ab+ 5b2) (87)
h2 =
3
[
11a− 2b+√89a2 + 8ab− 16b2]
2(8a2 − 13ab+ 5b2) (88)
To see that the derivative is indeed negative for h in this range, let us calculate the boundaries for
a = 38 and b = 1/4. This gives h1 ≈ 67 and h2 ≈ 48.85, hence the derivative should be negative at
h = 1. Evaluating (86) at h = 1 for a = 3/8 and b = 1/4 gives −53/32 < 0. Q.E.D.
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